Search the Community

ICANN, the organization responsible for ensuring the stability of the internet's Domain Name System (DNS), has published advice for all entities involved in DNS blocking. Three key recommendations arrive as part of a comprehensive report from ICANN's Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) on the technical means of DNS blocking and its effects - both intended and unintended. In 2006 alone, Russia-based AllOfMP3 reportedly banked $30 million from sales of an unauthorized music product for which the major labels received no payment. The unlikely stage for the industry’s response to global sales of cheap, unlicensed DRM-free music, was Denmark. Under pressure from industry group IFPI, ISP Tele2 blocked AllofMP3’s domain, an event that will soon celebrate its 20th anniversary. While never likely to threaten the site’s overall traffic, the Danish block was at once symbolic and historic. Nineteen years later, Denmark has almost 2,800 domains on its current blocklist, a figure that’s easily eclipsed by the tens of thousands of domains and subdomains blocked globally every month, largely without report or fanfare. ICANN Publishes DNS Blocking Report The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is the non-profit organization whose management of the internet’s name and number spaces (domains and DNS / IP addresses) helps to provide a stable internet. In a recently published report, ICANN provides a comprehensive view of the Domain Name System (DNS) and the effects of its antithesis: DNS blocking. Published by ICANN’s Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), ‘DNS Blocking Revisited’ aims to raise awareness among all internet users, but especially those whose decisions can make a real difference. For those considering DNS blocking as a potential solution, to the authorities with the power to permit or deny its use, ICANN’s message is clear. Full comprehension of the potential repercussions of DNS blocking is a prerequisite to limiting harm. “The aim of this report is to advise the Internet community, and especially policymakers and government officials, of the implications and consequences of using DNS blocking to control access to resources on the Internet,” the report begins. “DNS blocking can have serious side effects. A block may affect users outside the jurisdiction of the party doing the blocking. Users may not know that a block is in place, and can interpret it as a site outage or other error, encouraging potentially insecure behavior to ‘fix’ it. A block may affect domains that provide services for other domains, causing collateral damage beyond the intended scope of the block.” Motivation and Expectation ICANN takes no position on whether DNS blocking is good or bad, or whether specific motivations to block tip the scales one way or another. Whether supported by local law, justified on morality grounds, or mandated by governments purely for the purpose of censorship, the report focuses on the technical aspects of DNS blocking, the consequences, and advice to limit harm. The report defines DNS blocking as an approach to regulating or restricting access to information on the internet by interfering with the normal process of responding to DNS queries about domain names or IP addresses. This is usually achieved by “denying that a name or address exists or by providing false information about it.” While easy to implement, DNS blocking is only effective against users of the DNS where blocking is implemented, and has no effect on the existence of the targeted content, which remains accessible by alternative means. These limitations should be well understood since they help to determine whether DNS blocking can fulfil the stated objectives. Having weighed the benefits and considered the implications, DNS blocking may not be needed at all. “It is important that any entity mandating or implementing DNS blocking understands the implications of the technology. For example, DNS blocking in one jurisdiction can affect the accessibility of content in another jurisdiction. Legal authorities should form technically informed views about DNS blocking, and understand if, or the extent to which, DNS blocking may accomplish their goals and how it may affect parties outside their jurisdictions,” the report adds. Bad DNS Blocking is Bad DNS blocking often amounts to the protection of business interests, yet blocking for security reasons is encountered by millions of internet users every day. They include shielding minors from harmful or adult content, use of domain blocklists by major web browsers to warn users about unsafe sites, and DNS filtering to prevent exposure to malicious domains. An example cited by ICANN suggests that DNS blocking may even be a less restrictive alternative to avoid the global consequences of suspending an entire domain name. Yet, regardless of motivation, DNS blocking measures of any kind should have clearly defined scope. “While one jurisdiction may find that it is allowable and desirable to block a domain name, another jurisdiction may consider blocking that domain to be a violation of human or civil rights,” ICANN says. The report highlights legal action by rightsholders against Quad9 and Cloudflare. Where DNS blocking by ISPs targets a specific, clearly defined local ‘audience’, DNS blocking at public resolvers used by a global audience risks overblocking on a much bigger scale. In a case involving Quad9, a court order to block specific sites on copyright grounds offered no guidance on key technical issues, leaving Quad9 to block the sites globally, to avoid being held in contempt. DNS Blocking Weakens The Battle Against Security Threats ICANN’s report highlights issues involving internet security that are either caused or exacerbated by DNS blocking measures. For example, redirects due to DNS blocking can cause browser TLS errors that ordinarily signal a potential security threat. ICANN suggests that over exposure effectively ‘trains’ users to ignore certificate mismatches. In the wider fight against global threat actors, DNS block circumvention reduces visibility of both traffic patterns and security threats. “DNS data gives Internet Service Providers (ISPs) an important and accurate picture of both traffic patterns and security threats on their networks,” ICANN reports, adding that DNS data can help ISPs diagnose denial-of-service attacks, identify infected hosts, compromised domains, and vulnerable customers. “When users turn to alternative DNS servers, some network operators, ISPs, and enterprises may experience decreased ability to manage security threats and manage certain network operations. For example, if a user accesses the third party recursive resolver via an encrypted connection using DNS over HTTPS (DoH) or DNS over TLS (DoT) and is infected with malware, the user’s ISP may not be able to detect that and notify the infected user, since DNS telemetry is being diverted away from the ISP.” Disclosure, Transparency, Blocking Infrastructure While reduced visibility of threats is cited as a concern, the view of DNS blocking itself is often obscured by a lack of disclosure and limited transparency. “[DNS] blocking policies and actions are often not disclosed to affected parties, including to end users. This can make it difficult for end-users to understand when they are being blocked, or why,” ICANN warns. “Absent some level of transparency, DNS blocking can be difficult to recognize for what it is. It can be misdiagnosed as a hosting outage, a misconfiguration, or a malicious attack.” Before concluding with ICANN’s recommendations, an issue touched on briefly in the report but worth highlighting again, concerns the construction and embedding of online infrastructure to facilitate blocking of piracy, fraud, ransomware, and botnets. Citing a 2023 open letter written by TCP/IP co-developer Vinton Cerf, “Concerns Over DNS Blocking” warns that the same infrastructure could be easily adapted “to suppress internal dissent, censor outside information, and surveil dissidents and journalists.” ICANN Recommendations Listed here verbatim are three rock-solid recommendations from ICANN’s Security and Stability Advisory Committee. Recommendation 1: SSAC recommends that any entity implementing or mandating DNS blocking understand the implications of the technology. Recommendation 2: SSAC recommends that DNS blocking implemented by any entity — by a government or any organization that has policy, legal, or operational control over a network or service—follow these guidelines: A. The entity should determine whether DNS blocking will fulfill its objectives. B. The entity should have a clear policy about what and how it will block, with well-defined review and decision-making processes that minimize risk. C. The entity should implement the policy using a technique that minimizes overblocking or collateral damage that could affect its users. D. The entity should not affect networks or users outside its administrative control. Recommendation 3: SSAC recommends that operators of recursive servers use DNS Extended Error codes (see section 6.6 Extended DNS Error) to indicate to end users and troubleshooters that DNS blocking is taking place The report DNS Blocking Revisited is available here (pdf) Source Hope you enjoyed this news post. Thank you for appreciating my time and effort posting news every day for many years. News posts... 2023: 5,800+ | 2024: 5,700+ | 2025 (till end of May): 2,377 RIP Matrix | Farewell my friend

French courts continue to expand the scope of sports piracy related DNS blocking, as requested by rightsholders. While perceived as too broad by the targeted DNS resolvers, the orders are not signed blindly. A new court order issued this month rejects blocking requests for several sports streaming domains, noting that sports network beIN failed to supply sufficient proof that 'their' streams were pirated. In May last year, the Paris Judicial Court ordered Google, Cloudflare, and Cisco to block access to several pirate websites by effectively poisoning their DNS. The order, requested by Canal+, compelled the tech giants to modify their resolvers or take measures that had that effect, to prevent users from accessing unauthorized sports streams. In the months that followed, additional rightsholders such as DAZN and beIN joined in on the action with similar requests, while more DNS providers were added as targets, including Quad9 and Vercel. Transparency is limited, however, so it can be difficult to figure out who blocks what and why. BeIN Seeks New DNS Blocking Order This week, a new court order appeared on our radar which stands out for numerous reasons. The order was requested by a French sister company of Qatari multinational beIN and targets public DNS resolvers provided by Cloudflare, Google, and Quad9. BeIN’s complaint alleges that the DNS services allow the public to resolve domain names linked to sports piracy. This includes unauthorized broadcasts of the Bundesliga and the WTA Tennis tournament, for which beIN claims to be the licensed rightsholder. The legal paperwork is in many regards similar to that seen in previous applications; grounded in Article L. 333-10 of the French Sports Code, rightsholders are empowered to seek court orders against any entity that can help to stop ‘serious and repeated’ sports piracy. Court Rejects Domain Blocks Citing Insufficient Proof Previously, the Paris Judicial Court had few reservations regarding the infringing status of targeted domain names. In this case, however, several blocking requests were denied. According to the court, beIN failed to provide sufficient proof to warrant a blocking order under Article L. 333-10 for alleged infringing activity on sporttvls.com, lshunter.net, premiertv.watch, streamendous.online, and techydeals.online. Insufficient evidence To grant the requested blocking measures, the court needed to see evidence of “grave and repeated” infringements of beIN’s neighboring rights by these specific domains. In this case, the provided evidence fell short. No Logo, No Blocking This doesn’t mean that the websites can’t be labeled pirate sites. In fact, two of the domains were previously blocked in for grave and repeated copyright infringement. In this case, beIN appears to have shown the wrong streams in court. BeIN is not the exclusive rightsholder for these sporting events. For the WTA, for example, DAZN obtained broadcasting rights from the tennis tournament, which sublicensed it to beIN for the French territory. Similarly, beIN also holds derived rights to broadcast the Bundesliga in . This means that beIN has neighboring rights and, according to the Paris court, needs to show that streams infringing its neighboring rights are shown by the alleged pirate sites. For example, by displaying a beIN logo. That was not the case for all domains. For example, the infringement evidence for streamendous.online and techydeals.online included broadcasts with the DAZN logo, while some WTA streams did not include a logo at all. Therefore, the court deemed this proof to be insufficient. Cloudflare and Google Pushed Back The court’s decision to reject these blockades came after Google and Cloudflare objected. While many of their counterarguments were rejected by the court, both companies challenged beIN’s claim that it holds exclusive broadcast rights for these streams. The court agreed with this objection. It found that beIN’s evidence was insufficient to definitively prove its exclusive exploitation rights for the WTA Tour and Bundesliga competitions. BeIn was allowed to continue the case based on the neighboring rights it holds. Google subsequently argued that these were not sufficiently backed up by the evidence, as the logos (or lack thereof) revealed, which is ultimately why several blocking requests were denied. Opposition While neither Google nor Cloudflare will be pleased with the outcome, this case shows the importance of challenging blocking requests in court, although that’s not always feasible. Quad9: DNS Blocks are Fundamentally Wrong Quad9 was noticeably absent and General Manager Simon Forster informs us that his company didn’t make an appearance, simply because it lacks the resources to put up a fight. Forster highlights the challenges faced by his small Swiss non-profit organization. With a tight budget, confronting billion-euro corporations in court presents a significant hurdle for Quad9. Despite these financial constraints, Forster notes that Quad9 will continue to resist blocking actions to the best of its ability. He clarifies that the company’s decision not to defend itself in this particular case is due to a lack of resources, rather than an unwillingness to protect its rights and those of its users. ‘Fundamentally we believe that these blocking orders are wrong,’ Forster states, emphasizing that rightsholders have alternative methods to protect their content instead of pursuing legal action against content-neutral DNS providers. More Blocking Action Ahead? For now, there are no signs that rightsholders are backing down from their DNS blocking requests. On the contrary, these are rapidly expanding to other countries in Europe, and in the United States they are also part of a proposed site blocking bill. Given the opposition to recent court orders, Google and Cloudflare are expected to oppose these efforts fiercely, until all their options are exhausted. Whether beIN plans to partially refile its blocking request with the correct logos is unknown. If they do, a move by pirate stream operators to step up logo blurring could amount to a novel type of blocking circumvention, complicating matters further. — A copy of the latest blocking order, issued by the Paris Judicial Court on May 2 and published by Cloudflare in the Lumen Database is available here (pdf) Source Hope you enjoyed this news post. Thank you for appreciating my time and effort posting news every day for many years. News posts... 2023: 5,800+ | 2024: 5,700+ | 2025 (till end of April): 1,811 RIP Matrix | Farewell my friend

A highly controversial court order that required Cisco, Cloudflare, and Google to poison DNS earlier this year was just the beginning. To further combat sports piracy, broadcaster Canal+ sought several follow-up orders. Cisco had discontinued its OpenDNS service in due to the legal restrictions, so only Google and Cloudflare put up a defense, but without the desired result. In May, the Paris Judicial Court ordered Google, Cloudflare, and Cisco to block access to several pirate websites by poisoning their DNS. The order, issued under Article L.333-10 of the French Sports Code, compelled the tech giants to prevent users from accessing unauthorized streams of Champions League and Premier League matches. Applicant Canal+ argued that the alternative DNS resolvers allowed people to bypass the “regular” blocking measures implemented by internet providers. The tech companies opposed the measures, characterizing the blocking demands as overbroad. They presented a list of concerns and caveats, none of which convinced the court. A request to postpone the measures pending appeal was also denied. As a result, Google and Cloudflare both implemented DNS poisoning measures in . Cisco’s OpenDNS service, meanwhile, decided to leave altogether, impacting all users of its service in the country. The initial blocking efforts targeted a few dozen pirate sports streaming domains, including Footybite, Hesgoal, and Livekoora. While the additional DNS blocking order made it harder to access these sites, many other pirate sites remained accessible. DNS Poisoning Spreads To patch these holes, Canal+ returned to court multiple times in recent weeks, securing multiple DNS blocking orders that add many other pirate streaming domains to the blocklist. This follow-up action initially went unreported, but Cloudflare recently uploaded three Paris Judicial Court orders to the Lumen Database to provide more transparency. These orders show that once successful, Canal+ continued to expand the scope of the blocking. In September, the court granted Canal+’s blocking request for 15 domain names, including livetv.lol, sporttune.com, and crvsport.ru. These sites offered access to Formula 1 streams without permission. Once again the court concluded that DNS resolvers are intermediaries that contribute to the illegal streaming activity. As such, they must take action. At the time the order was published, Cisco’s OpenDNS service had already left , so no action was required. Cloudflare and Google, on the other hand, were given just three days to comply. Following the “Formula 1” order, Canal+ requested two additional orders that were granted last month. These targeted dozens of other sports streaming domains, through which pirated Champions League and Premier League matches were available. These latest orders only target Cloudflare and Google, which were again required to block the domain names within three days. Tech Companies Defense Both tech companies presented a defense in court. Among other things, Cloudflare and Google argued that the blocking measures are disproportionate, costly, and ineffective. There are simpler ways to block access, they noted, pointing out that the measures would not be effective because users could use VPNs or other DNS resolvers to bypass the blocks. The Paris Court disagreed, insisting that blocking measures are proportionate and necessary. Canal+ could choose the blocking measures it deemed appropriate and the existence of alternative solutions is irrelevant, the court said. Cloudflare and Cisco further argued that the legal justification for these blockades, Article L. 333-10 of the French Sports Code, does not apply to DNS resolvers. They claimed that they do not provide a “transmission function” and therefore are not “intermediaries” under EU law. Again, the Paris court disagreed. It asserted that DNS resolvers do play a role in transmitting content and can be considered intermediaries under EU law. Google also mentioned that some pirate streaming domains are customers of Cloudflare’s CDN service, implying that its fellow defendant could take more proactive measures. However, the court ruled that this wouldn’t relieve DNS providers of their responsibilities. While Cloudflare and Google must comply with the court orders, they will likely try to overturn the decisions on appeal. According to the tech companies, these orders fragment the global Internet, jeopardizing the trust and integrity of DNS as a core global infrastructure — Copies of the three additional DNS blocking order issues by the Paris judicial court are available here (1, 2, 3, pdf) A list of all affected domain names is available below. Some domain names such as livetv807.me, antenasports.ru, and sporttuna.sx, appear in multiple orders. aliezstream.pro antenasport.shop antenasports.ru antenasports.shop antenatv.online antenatv.store antennasport.ru aspoitv.shop livetv802.me toparena.store emb.ap1357.me embx224539.ap1357.me 1qwebplay.xyz livetv807.me cdn.livetv807.me boxtv60.com infinity-ott.com vbn123.com futbolenvivo.ru centralareana.live crvspoît.ru livetv.lol streameast.buffstream.io sporttuna.sx freestreams-live1se.nu streamonsport.nî 26216.stunserver.net viwlivehdplay.ru bestmlb.buffstream.io 1.dlhd.sx claplivehdplay.ru sporttuna.com sporttuna.site livetv806.me rojadirectahdenvivo.com streamsthunder.tv rojadirectenvivo.me methstreams.me antenasports.ru asportv.shop toparena.store lshunter.net tv1337.buzz livetv.sx sporttuna.pro livetv807.me embx224539.ap1366.me cdn.livetv807.me locatedinfain.com tvhd.tutvlive.info stream-24.net speci4leagle.com vl.methstreams.me klubsports.fun weblivehdplay.ru buddycenters.shop olalivehdplay.ru Iqwebplay.xyz sporttvls.com euro2024direct.ru librarywhispering.com cdn.livetv808.me watch.sporttuna.pro sporttuna.sx sporttuna.online lewblivehdplay.ru viwlivehdplay.ru r365.city finytv.com Source Hope you enjoyed this news post. Thank you for appreciating my time and effort posting news every day for many years. 2023: Over 5,800 news posts | 2024 (till end of October): 4,832 news posts RIP Matrix | Farewell my friend